# **Annual Report 2024**

# **Report on Activities and Finances**



# April 1, 2024 – March 31, 2025 Mekong Watch

**Not-for-Profit Organization (NPO)** 



## **Contents**

Introduction	1
About Mekong Watch	
Activities for April 1, 2024– March 31, 2025	3
A. Investigative Research: field surveys and research into aid policies of Japanese and international institutions	
B. Field Projects: environmental conservation activities in the Mekong basin	
C. Outreach in Japan and Abroad	
D. Advocacy	
Appendices	11
Board/Staff/Interns and Volunteers	15
Financial Statement	16

Cover photo: Conducting a survey in suburban Phnom Penh

## Introduction

# **About Mekong Watch**



Our vision is

for the people of the Mekong Region to benefit from the region's natural environments and sustain ways of life that are rooted in the integrity of their environments, without falling victim to the harmful impacts of destructive development.

Through dialogue, we can improve development projects and policies so as to prevent or ameliorate their negative impacts.

These are Mekong Watch's activities.

From the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many development projects have been proposed, purportedly to eliminate poverty. To the socially vulnerable, in particular, the existence of a natural environment in which they can obtain food is critically important. The changes in society and the environment that accompany these development projects, however, can easily lead to environmental destruction and removal of the inhabitants, resulting in the loss of means of livelihood and places for the people to live. Development does not always benefit people financially, but runs the risk of depriving people of independence and forcing them into poverty.

While ascertaining the problems faced locally through direct dialogue with the people being harmed by development on the one hand, we reach out on the other hand to the people responsible for formulating and implementing development policies.



### **Mekong Watch's Initiatives**

- 1. Information gathering and analysis on development policies, projects, and organizations that carry out development (development institutions, recipient country governments, private companies).
  - We analyze environmental impact assessments of dam, hydropower and other projects and investigate the environmental policies of countries in carrying out development.
- 2. Fostering understanding, developing resources on the environment and society.
  - We gather information on the lives of people residing in places where development is occurring and release it to the public in written or video form.
- 3. Gathering information, conducting analyses, and developing resources on development, including historical case studies.
  - We gather moral lessons from the impoverishment of residents and other negative effects that have resulted in the past from development projects and document these.
- 4. Communicating and networking with NGOs, citizens and persons involved in projects in the Mekong Region or in countries involved with aid and investment (including Japan).
  - We convey information on problems with development projects to NGOs and citizens of the countries in the Mekong Basin undergoing development and the countries executing or providing aid for these projects. In addition, we build cooperative relations with NGOs and citizens groups sharing our concerns and work with them to resolve issues.
- 5. Targeting our advocacy activities at development protagonists using the policies and programs of those same protagonists.
  - We utilize the systems of the Asian Development Bank and other institutions for expressing formal objections, conveying the views of the local people to development institutions, informing the public of problems and urging stronger movements toward having these institutions solve those problems.
- Advocating for improvement in environmental and social consideration policies in Mekong countries via aid-providing countries and aid organizations.
  - Citizen's concerns are not reflected sufficiently in the policies of countries with weak governance. On the other hand, countries and organizations providing aid to the Mekong Region have opportunities to get involved in improving the environment-related policies of the countries they are aiding. By conveying the concerns of the residents to them and relaying past problems, we advocate for the application of Mekong countries' environmental policies as a tool for solving local problems.

#### Medium-term Goals (FY2022-FY2025)

- 1. Increase the number of cases in which the lessons of past development are applied to projects in various stages of progress in the Mekong basin countries and surrounding areas and the views of those affected are respected.
- 2. Increase the number of cases in the Mekong basin countries in which environmental/social policies and programs improve in a way that reflects past lessons of development, the natural environment, and ways of life rooted in the integrity of that environment.
- 3. People affected by development in the Mekong basin countries take action to prevent or ameliorate harmful effects on their environment, society and human rights.
- 4. Increase the number of people who know about the past lessons of development, the natural environment, and people's lifestyles rooted in the integrity of their environments in the Mekong basin countries.

#### FY2024 Activities

# [Local Conditions and Changes Resulting from Mekong Watch Activities in FY2024]

While 2023 was said to be the hottest year in observational history, 2024 set a new record. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has announced its confirmation that the global average temperature has risen by 1.55°C compared to before the Industrial Revolution. Climate change is proceeding at a fast pace. Flood damage has been occurring frequently in all Mekong Basin nations, but the citizens must continue to lead their lives through long dry seasons and frequent extreme rain events.

In Vietnam, there have been several detentions and convictions in the past few years of environmental activists who were addressing climate change, and the UN Special Rapporteur has expressed concern. Three of them were released suddenly in 2023, followed by one more in 2024, but lawyer Dang Dinh Bach, who had been sentenced to five years in prison remains incarcerated. Since his detention in June 2021, Mr. Bach has appealed his innocence, frequently carrying out hunger strikes. His health is a matter of considerable concern.

In Vietnam, nuclear power plant construction projects in Ninh Thuan Province, which were completely halted in 2016, are set to resume. In February 2025, after the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party agreed to revive the plans, seeking a stable power supply, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh appointed business operators for nuclear power plants to be constructed in two locations in the province. The Vietnamese government aims for their completion by 2030. Assistance from Russia is being implemented, and the Japanese government has also expressed its interest in providing assistance, so we need to keep a close eye on the situation.

In Cambodia, unresolved issues include the environmental damage suffered by indigenous and ethnic minorities resulting from operation of the Lower Sesan 2 Dam in the northwest of the country, along with relocation and compensation issues. We are striving to resolve these issues in close communication with local communities and NGOs, such as by seeking accountability from International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, who has been indirectly involved in the project.

In Myanmar, since the coup d'etat of February 1, 2021, more than 6,000 people have lost their lives in conflicts or violence committed by the military junta or by security forces under the direction of the junta. Citizens have managed to assert their autonomy in some areas, but the situation is even worse in many others. A huge earthquake struck central Myanmar in late March this fiscal year, and there are concerns that conditions may arise that would prevent sufficient aid from reaching the area.

The Japanese government has never changed its stance despite the coup, and has not halted existing Official Development Assistance (ODA). Moreover, the real estate project

known commonly as the "Y Complex," the rent for which is under contract to be paid to the Office of the Quartermaster General (the military's logistics bureau), is being invested in and debt-guaranteed through a public-private fund, the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development (JOIN), which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Regarding JOIN, it has come to light that they have incurred huge business losses in Myanmar, including in the Y Complex, so the MLIT established an expert committee to examine the situation, including the organization's viability. In response to this, we have also expressed our views on the matter. In addition, there have been problems with disclosure of official documents regarding JOIN, and this has led us to file a lawsuit against the MLIT. For more information on this see the column on the lawsuit (page 8). In the coming fiscal year, we will continue to bring up issues regarding projects that benefit Myanmar's military.

In Laos, dam construction projects are progressing on the main stream of the Mekong River. Recently an increasing number of reports have appeared that point to the country's debt problem. About 20 years have passed since the Nam Theun 2 Dam, which Mekong Watch strongly opposed, began operating, and there are concerns about how people will be affected as a consequence of hydropower investment.

Japan's development assistance and investment have had a long-term impact on the power generation sector in Thailand. In recent decades, the predominant form of power generation in Thailand has been gas-fired, relying on fossil fuels. Amid a continuing surplus capacity in power generation, there is an ongoing controversy between the citizens and the government over excessive capital investment in power generation projects with significant environmental impacts. Thailand has a high potential for solar power generation as well, but renewable energy has been slow to propagate there. Since the Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) promoted by the Japanese government is anticipated to have an impact in the future, we have provided opportunities this fiscal year for Thai and Japanese citizens, researchers and media to exchange information and gain a better mutual understanding of each other's situation in both countries.

### A. Investigative Research

Mekong Watch engages in two types of investigative research. The first is monitoring of projects and programs for potential threats to people who rely on natural resources. In recent years, we have begun monitoring corporate activity amid the rise of private sector-led development projects. The second is field research (not limited to that involved in specific development projects) conducted in cooperation with local residents to collect basic data and deepen overall understanding of the connection between the environment and people's lives. The information and knowledge gained from this research form the basis of our advocacy work.

### A-1. Project Monitoring

Continuing from the previous fiscal year, we kept monitoring developments such as coal-fired power plant projects funded by JBIC and conducting activities to stop the flow of funds from Japan to the Myanmar military. Monitoring activities of FY2024 are listed below. Countries/organizations providing or considering providing funds are indicated in parentheses. For further details on any of the projects, see Mekong Watch's website. http://www.mekongwatch.org/ report/index.html)

#### [Myanmar (Burma)]

"#No More Business with the Myanmar Junta"

The number of internally displaced refugees in Myanmar since the February 1, 2021 military coup d'etat has surpassed 3.5 million as of 2024, and is predicted to continue growing. In addition, many government officials and citizens calling for democratization have been unjustly detained.

Four years have passed since the coup was carried out, but we have continued our activities in cooperation with various citizens' groups, including the "#No More Business With The Myanmar Junta" campaign (organized by the AYUS International Buddhist Cooperation Network, Friends of the Earth Japan, Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), Network Against Japan Arms Trade (NAJAT) and from the current fiscal year, Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC), in addition to Mekong Watch), while regularly making recommendations based on on-line signature and survey results, and appealing in front of the Prime Minister's office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stop the flow of funding from Japan to the junta.

The Bago River Bridge Construction Project using ODA yen loans is subcontracted mainly with military-affiliated businesses, so we pointed out the problematic nature of paying ODA funds for this project. We also took action regarding the public-private fund Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development (JOIN), by requesting the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and its affiliated expert committee to develop systems for information disclosure and human rights consideration. We also sent questionnaires to TASAKI & Co., Ltd. which has been engaged in pearl farming in Myanmar, and to its investors, inquiring about the status of their implementation of due diligence on human rights.

This fiscal year, we issued the following letters of request and press releases.

[Inquiry] Inquiry regarding TASAKI's business partnership with sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearls Enterprise (June 11, 2024)

[Inquiry] Inquiry regarding human rights due diligence in relation to TASAKI's business partnership with sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearls Enterprise (June 11, 2024)

[Statement] The Japanese government should stop paying reserve money upon completion of the Bago River Bridge Construction Project, which would benefit the Myanmar military (June 13, 2024)

[Statement] Public-private fund investing in a problematic project that benefits the Myanmar military discloses its losses - The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) as the supervisory authority is asked to be accountable for protecting human rights (June 28, 2024)

[Press Release] Myanmar pearl company TASAKI and investors risk complicity in Myanmar military junta's international crimes - TASAKI must responsibly end all business with the sanctioned entity Myanmar Pearl Enterprise (July 10, 2024)

[Letter of Request] We demand information disclosure regarding the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development (JOIN), and the establishment of a system for consideration of human rights (August 22, 2024)

[Letter of Request] We ask for international cooperation that will reach people facing difficulties in Myanmar without fail (October 4, 2024)

[Statement] The losses to the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development (JOIN) in the Y Complex Project, which benefits the Myanmar military have been revealed to be 10.9 billion yen—JOIN should responsibly withdraw from this problematic project in Myanmar (November 28, 2024)

We have established a "#No More Business with the Myanmar Junta" page at our website that summarizes our activities to date. Please refer to it (in Japanese). http://www.mekongwatch.org/report/burma/mbusiness.html

#### Other Projects:

- Thilawa Special Economic Zone (JICA, Japanese private sector, others)
- Dawei Special Economic Zone (JBIC, Thai and Japanese private sectors, others)
  The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), together with the governments of Thailand and Myanmar have established a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to develop the Dawei SEZ. The project, however, stalled due to Myanmar's military coup, with the junta announcing in 2025 that it would abolish the SPV and establish a development partnership anew with Russia. With the Memorandum of Intent between the governments of Japan, Thailand and Myanmar expiring, the Japanese government is expected to withdraw from

### [Laos]

Xayaburi Dam on the Mekong Mainstream (Thai private sector, others)

#### [Thailand]

this development.

- Thai Overseas Investment Projects in Mekong Basin Countries (Thai private sector)
- Projects related to Asia Zero Emission Community (Thai and Japanese government/ Thai and Japanese private sector)
- Thai Electric Power Development and Japan

The Japanese government has been deeply involved in the field of electric power development in Thailand, through official development assistance (ODA) to Thailand that began in the 1960s, and through the provision of public funds to independent power producers (IPP), whose entrance into the business was enabled by the market liberalization in the 1990s. In line with the goals of the Paris Agreement, the Thai government has declared a goal of carbon neutrality by 2050, having announced its Long-Term Low-Emission Development Strategy (LT-LEDS) in 2021. Its more concrete Power Development Plan (PDP), however, has been presented as a draft repeatedly and revised, but has never been finalized. Thailand is currently heavily reliant on gas, a fossil fuel, for power generation. For many years, civil society in Thailand has been indicating to the government that its excessive investment in power plants and long-term contracts with private companies that require payment even if they do not generate electricity have led to higher electricity prices. Discussions with the government continue.

With Japan's deep involvement in power development in the past, along with participation by Japanese companies in many of Thailand's IPPs, Japanese business

cannot be said to have no connection to Thailand's greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, research on ammonia co-firing at coal-fired power plants was also conducted recently using Japanese funds. In light of these facts, we conducted a tour for Thai journalists to study the circumstances of Japanese electric power. Thanks to this action, news reports have appeared about the current state of Japanese involvement in Thailand (for more details, see Appendix 4). At the same time, we invited a member of a civic group promoting the spread of renewable energy and a researcher taking a financial approach to solving the climate change problem to Japan for a seminar.

#### [Cambodia]

 Lower Sesan 2 Hydropower Project (Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian private sectors, others)

The Lower Se San 2 Dam, a hydroelectric power station in operation in Stung Treng Province, is recognized to have had World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) involvement. Thus in consultation with the affected residents and their support groups, we approached the IFC's Office of Compliance Advisor and Ombudsman (CAO) seeking relief. The CAO held a hearing with the stakeholders including the villagers and is expected to publish a report on it in FY2025.

#### [Vietnam]

Vietnam declared in 2021 that it would achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, signing a statement that it would phase out coal-fired power generation in the 2040s (or as soon as possible thereafter). In 2022, the donor nation group, which includes Japan, and the Vietnamese government announced the launch of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with the goals of accelerating the early retirement of infrastructure with high greenhouse gas emissions and promoting the introduction of renewable energy.


The JETP Resource Mobilization Plan (JETP-RMP) was announced in 2023, but meanwhile, the Van Phong 1 Coal-fired Power Plant, which has public and private sector involvement from Japan, began commercial operation in 2024, while construction of the Vung Ang II has proceeded ceaselessly. It is expected to begin commercial operation in the second half of 2025. Furthermore, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has indicated that there is no further room for new gas field development if we are to follow the path to achieving net-zero by 2050. Yet Japanese private and public sector organizations have been promoting the development of the offshore Block B Gas Field, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) decided in July 2024 to co-finance the project, including construction of a gas transportation pipeline to the O Mon Power Complex. They are clearly off that path. Japan's public and private sectors are involved in the planning of several liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects as well.

- Hai Phong Coal-Fired Power Plant (JBIC)
- Vinh Tan 4 and 4 Extension Coal-Fired Power Plants (JBIC)
- Nghi Son 2 Coal-Fired Power Plant (JBIC)
- Van Phong Coal-Fired Power Plant (JBIC)
- Vung Ang 2 Coal-Fired Power Plant (JBIC)
- Block B- O Mon Project (Upstream and Midstream)(JOGMEC, JBIC)

#### A-2. Research

As to our reporting on human rights in the Mekong River Basin, once again there has been a delay. We are continuing our work to release a report to the public in the first half of FY2025.

# [Column] Lawsuit Filed to Challenge Japan's Decision to Keep Environmental Information Secret



Page on environmental and social considerations blacked out in document "disclosed" by the MLIT.

For the Government of Japan to achieve an administration that is more open to the public, the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs stipulates the right to request disclosure of documents held by administrative agencies and other bodies. Documents by "public-private funds," however, are not subject to disclosure requests even when large sums of public funds are used, since private funds are also involved. On the other hand, documents held by the competent authority of a public-private fund, are subject to disclosure requests.

Mekong Watch has filed multiple disclosure requests with the MLIT, trying to obtain information on the real estate project in Myanmar commonly known as the "Y Complex Project," in which the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development (JOIN), a public-private fund under the MLIT's jurisdiction, has invested and holds a debt guarantee. In one example, in the decision (*Kokusokaisui* No. 73) to disclose part of a government document that we received from the MLIT dated August 8, 2023, the section on environmental and social considerations (the page titled "9, *Kankyo-Shakai Hairyo* (Environmental and Social Considerations)" shown in the photo in this column) was not disclosed, so we requested that the non-disclosure be lifted, filing suit on February 20, 2025 against the MLIT in Tokyo District Court.

We decided to file this suit because we believe that this decision not to disclose the information is a serious issue that may be a significant setback for citizens who have worked hard encouraging the Japanese government and have achieved a growing set of precedents on information disclosure.

Information on environmental and social considerations is not considered to be "a corporation's inside information which never would have been publicly disclosed," or to be sensitive in "posing a risk of harm to a corporation's legitimate interests if it were disclosed to the public." Nor can it be said that "there is a risk of damage to relationships of trust with other nations or international organizations." The reason for that is that many nations have established laws and regulations on environmental assessment and are disclosing information broadly. In Myanmar's case, an environmental impact assessment procedure came into force in December 2015 during an era of civil governance, and the environmental impact assessment report for the Y Complex Project is even available online.

In addition, there is also an established information disclosure system within Japanese governmental organizations such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) regarding environmental and social considerations in overseas projects involving Japanese public institutions. After receiving the above-mentioned blacked out page with the notice of the decision dated August 8, 2023, Mekong Watch used the appeals system under Article 2 of Japan's Administrative Appeal Act to request a review on October 6, 2023 asking that their decision to black out the information be rescinded. The system for requesting examinations consists of a mechanism for filing a request for review of an administrative agency's disposal if there are objections to it, with the agency in question receiving the claim, as a general rule, consulting with the Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection Review Board, receiving their report and issuing a conclusion (decision) on the request to review.

This Review Board should conduct its investigation and deliberations from a disinterested third-party standpoint, but in this case, it judged the non-disclosure to have been reasonable. Their report was extremely disappointing because it failed to take into account the fact that hundreds of pages of environmental assessments had already been made available to the public, and Japan had accumulated a track record of information disclosure regarding environmental and social considerations.

Given this outcome, pursuing disclosure of the information on the environmental and social considerations of the Y Complex Project (although it is also surprising in itself that it took up only one page of the document) meant filing a lawsuit against the MLIT in Tokyo District Court.

### **B. Field Projects**


Our field projects consist of activities aimed at understanding the state of natural resources of inhabitants of countries of the Mekong Basin. We document the people's ways of living with nature and help residents of the region manage their natural resources.

No relevant activities in this fiscal year.

### C. Outreach in Japan and Abroad

#### **♦**Seminars and lectures

Our seminars and lectures communicate the problems of development and the environment in Mekong basin countries to the general public. In FY2024, we held seven seminars and other events related to Myanmar. We also screened a film about Myanmar at two venues. In addition, we held one study session on global warming countermeasures, one seminar on energy development issues in Thailand and one online screening on river environments. We also co-hosted a symposium on business and human rights with other organizations. (For a summary of our seminars and lectures, see Appendix 1.)



Seminar "Thailand's Power Development Plan and Issues to Consider" (held on December 4, 2024)

#### ♦ Official magazine, Forum Mekong

To increase the reach of Forum Mekong, we transitioned to digital-only distribution. Our back issues are also available online in PDF format.

"Introduction to the Report 'Conflicting Priorities: A review of Thailand's humanitarian initiative in Karen State'" was released in September as PDF version No. 12.

#### ◆ Mekong River development e-mail newsletter

Mekong Watch disseminates news on development and environmental issues in the Mekong region via an e-mail newsletter. In FY2024, we issued eight newsletters in Japanese.

Also, in collaboration with other NGOs, we issued a total of 20 messages, including press releases and letters of request, on policies regarding aid to Myanmar and climate change countermeasures being taken by the Japanese public and private sectors.

#### **♦**Website

Difficulty keeping pace with the large number of issues occurring in the Mekong basin and making updates on them quickly, together with thoroughly updating our English website

continue to be tasks for us. We continue to make use of Facebook, Instagram and X (former Twitter) to help spread information.

#### **♦**Providing lecturers and publishing research

We sent our staff to give talks on Mekong River development, the environment, ODA and Business and Human Rights issues at lectures and seminars (see Appendix 2). In FY2024, our staff gave 49 lectures at universities and eight public lectures including webinar.

#### ◆Media outreach

The goal of our media outreach is not to attract coverage of Mekong Watch's activities, but to increase coverage of the development issues we are concerned about. Mekong Watch was involved in the creation of 23 media stories in this fiscal year. This fiscal year we provided information to NHK for its special program on Myanmar.

\* Mekong Library: Previously opened to provide information Mekong Watch had gathered to the public, our library is closed for the time being. At our urging for information disclosure to civil society, many international aid organizations have started providing information on the Internet. For this reason, we determined that it was less necessary for us to disclose information we had gathered. We are accepting inquiries about individual items of documentation from the past.

### D. Advocacy

Our advocacy has three objectives: (1) improve individual aid projects; (2) question development in the Mekong basin countries; and (3) encourage the Japanese government to reflect past experience in ODA and other policies and processes.

# ◆Reviewing the Asian Development Bank's (ADB's) Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies

The ADB has an accountability mechanism that allows residents of the developing member countries (DMCs) to seek redress and demand remedies for damages suffered as a result of ADB policy violations. For the first time in 12 years, the ADB is taking steps to revise this system. We, together with other NGOs in Asian nations, are participating in the review process, and are making recommendations to help the accountability mechanism work more effectively to reduce or avoid environmental and social damage.

### **♦JICA Act Revision**

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the "Expert Meeting on Mobilization of New Funds for Development" in July 2024 with regard to Official Development Assistance (ODA), and has been accepting recommendations on the ideal way to run ODA. On the basis of these recommendations, the "Act of the Incorporated Administrative Agency—Japan International Cooperation Agency" (JICA Act) is expected to be revised.

#### ♦Improving individual projects

We held meetings (detailed below) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) on individual aid projects, with the aim of pushing for improvements to problems we identified through our project monitoring activities. The agendas for our regularly held meetings with MOF can be found in Appendix 5.

# Appendices

Appendix 1

# Mekong Watch Seminars/Lectures April 2024 - March 2025

年月日	イベント名	テーマ・表題	講演者
2024/5/18	Webinar Series:	・国内避難民が増え苦境が続いてい	Naw K'nyaw Paw
	Listening to Voices	るカレン州の現状のほか、最前線に	Adelina Kamal
	from Myanmar	いる人道支援者の活動状況や、日本	(#NoMoreBusinessW
	Session 4:	政府を含む国際社会への現地からの	ithJunta campaign
	Navigating Crisis:	要望	organizers with
	Direct Humanitarian	・もっとも困難な人たちに援助を直	Progressive
	Aid to Myanmar's	接届けるにあたっての課題や対処法	Voice)
	Most Vulnerable	についての専門家の見解を紹介	
2024/6/15	オンライン上映会「開	・川と暮らしにまつわる以下 2 本の	木口由香(解説)
	発の中の声を聴く 川	映像の上映	
	と暮らす人びと」	・「タームの森と人びと」タイの東	
		北部で「ターム」と呼ばれる川沿い	
		の湿地林と、それを利用してきた	
		人々と開発に翻弄されてきた暮らし	
		・「源流からの声(原題:The Flow and The Voices of Origin)」2021	
		and the voices of origin)   2021   年のミャンマー軍によるクーデター	
		年のミャンマー単によるケーティー   後に「川のための国際行動デー」に	
		後に「川のための国际打動」―」に   合わせて制作された、ミャンマーの	
		各民族の声を集めた映像	
2024/7/25	Webinar Series:	・ロヒンギャの置かれている現状	Tun Khin
2024/ 1/ 20	Listening to Voices	や、ミャンマー軍が行ってきた国際	(#NoMoreBusinessW
	from Myanmar	犯罪について同軍の責任追及の取り	ithJunta campaign
	Session 5: On the	組み	organizers with
	Brink: the unending	・正当な裁きと人権を求めて闘うロ	Progressive
	persecution of	ヒンギャを支え、国際社会がふたた	Voice)
	Rohingya	び彼らを見捨てないようにするため	
		に日本の人びとや政府ができること	
		は何かを考える	
2024/8/3	上映会・トーク∶ミャ	・ミッソンダムの建設に反対の声を	(共催:アーユス仏
2024/8/17	ンマー・ドキュメンタ	上げた女性たちの声と、自分たちの	教国際協力ネットワ
	リー映画『地の上、地	文化を新しい方法で守ろうとする若	ーク、ロータスプロ
	の下』 環境問題に抗	いミュージシャンたちの姿を追いか	ジェクト、協力:延
	う女性・若者たちの声	けたドキュメンタリーの上映会	立寺、後援:山形ド
	をきく		キュメンタリー映画
0004/10/0	Walainan Cari	ハサーマタエルトラー・マナサ	祭)
2024/10/3		・分散型で多面的なアプローチを特	Zee Pe
	Listening to Voices	徴とするミャンマーで現在起きてい	Kyi Nyein
	from Myanmar Session 6: Youth &	る運動について知る ・日本の市民や政府がミャンマーの	(#NoMoreBusinessW ithJunta campaign
	Digital Freedom in	・日本の市氏や政府がミャンマーの   若者と連帯し、連邦民主制をめざ	organizers with
	Myanmar - Voices	右有と連帯し、連邦民王制をめる   す、様々な民族や分野、世代や階級	Progressive
	from the Frontlines	からなる抵抗運動を支えることを考	Voice)
	TO THE THE	える	10100/
2024/10/24	ウェビナー : ミャンマ	・TASAKI の事業を巡る問題点	木口由香
	一真珠ビジネスの問題	・ビデオ「真珠と引き換えられた民	
	点	族 日本語字幕版」紹介	
L			1

1			
2024/12/4	セミナー:タイのエネルギー開発計画の問題点とは?	・日本もさまざまに関係するタイの 電力分野で、パリ協定の目標達成に 向かうためには何が必要なのか。そ こにどのように市民参加が可能なの か。タイの地域から再生エネルギー 普及に取り組む市民と、財務面から 気候変動の解決に取り組む研究者か らの報告	木口由香、ラピパット・インガシット、 ガン・タティヤクン (協力: NPO 法人ア ーユス仏教国際協力 ネットワーク)
2024/12/12	Webinar Series: Listening to Voices from Myanmar Session 7: From Crisis to Hope: Building a Federal Future in Myanmar	・ミャンマーで続く危機と、草の根から連邦民主制を築くための人々のたゆみない努力を知る・ミャンマーへの最大の人道支援国である日本政府がミャンマーでの危機に取り組み、ミャンマーの人々を効果的かつ建設的に支えるためにどのような方向性があるか考える	Khin Ohmar Banya Khung Aung (#NoMoreBusinessW ithJunta campaign organizers with Progressive Voice)
2025/1/26	シンポジウム「ビジネ スと人権: 紛争・暮し と私たちの暮し ~ミャンマー、パリカー から」	・日本のビジネスや経済援助が関係 する具体的な問題についてまた市民社会 団体が、個別事例の問題点や海外で の取り組みを提示しつつ、の取り組みを提示しても ける「ビジネスと人権」への現状と課題を議論し、なり組み みの現状と課題を議論し、取り組み が必要であることを訴えた	本幸(Bulletin、法部と を明 BDS Japan Bulletin、法部と を明 BDS 大学
2025/1/27	#ミャンマー軍の資金 源を断て オンライン セミナー 日本からミャンマー軍 への資金の流れ、今ど うなっているのか	・ミャンマー軍を利する日本からの 資金の流れを止めるために、クーデ ターから4年目の市民の取り組みで 達成できたこと、また、残る課題に ついて報告	木口由香 (#NoMoreBusinessW ithJunta campaign organizers)
2025/2/1	クーデターから 4 年、 ミャンマー文学と祈り のタベ	・ミャンマーや他の紛争で失われた 命を追悼すると共に、ミャンマーの 人びとの希望への理解を深めるため の読書会	(#NoMoreBusinessW ithJunta campaign organizers)
2025/2/7	【院内勉強会】アジアの脱炭素化に貢献する日本の政策の在り方とは?~アジア市民の視点から考える	・インドネシア、オーストラリア、 バングラデシュ、フィリピンでそれ ぞれ気候、環境、エネルギーの問題 に取り組んでいる市民団体のスタッフに来日いただき、日本が依然として公的な支援を行っている化石燃料 事業や『誤った気候変動対策』の現状と課題について報告 ・公正かつ公平なエネルギー移行や 脱炭素化に向けて取り組むアジア市 民社会の声から、日本の公的支援の 在り方を考える	田辺有輝、エリン・ ライアン、ドゥウィ・サウン、ハサウライアン、ハサン・メへディ (共催:国際環境 NGO FOE Japan、 「環境・持続社会」 研究センター (JACSES)、協力: アジア太平洋資料センター)

#NoMoreBusinessWithJunta campaign organizers (Mekong Watch, ayus: Network of Buddhists Volunteers on International Cooperation, Friends of the Earth Japan, Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), and Network Against Japan Arms Trade (NAJAT), Pacific Asia Resource Center)

Appendix 2

### Mekong Watch Lectures Organized by Others April 2024 - March 2025

年月日	講演 場所/主催	テーマ・表題			
2024/4/6	FAV リターンズ映画祭	ミャンマーのドキュメンタリー映画『地の上、地			
		の下』解説			
2024/4/12	大阪・吹田市民有志の会	タイから見た日本:市民の活力について			
2024/4/26	First Mekong Human Rights	Engaging Chinese Stakeholders to Address			
	Quiet Diplomacy Program	Human Rights Impacts of Lower Sesan II			
		Hydropower Dam (LS2) in Cambodia			
2024/6/25	アジア太平洋資料センター 自	ミャンマー:紛争に流れる資金を止めるためには			
	由学校				
2024/7/17	地雷廃絶日本キャンペーン・オ	「ミャンマーの紛争とわたしたちのお金」			
	ンラインセミナー				
2024/9/28	Mekong ASEAN Environmental	International Financial Institutions'			
	Week (MAEW) 2024	Investment in Southeast Asia			
2025/3/15	球磨川流域と私たちの暮らしの	「川と私たちの未来-過去から未来へ、世界から			
	在り方を考えるプロジェクト	日本へ。私たちはどこへ向かう?一」			
2025/3/18	Choose Life Project	虐殺加担に組みこまれた年金			
2025/3/26-27	School of English for Engaged	Big Dam (What is it Good for?)			
	Social Service (SENS)				
大学での講義:各	大学での講義:各大学で計49回				

Appendix 3

### Publications by Mekong Watch Staff April 2024 - March 2025

年月日	掲載	テーマ・表題
2024/11/26	Bangkok Post	End Japan's loans to Myanmar's Tatmadaw
2025 年 3 月号	月刊誌「地平」投稿	ミャンマー「春の革命」を理解する

Appendix 4

### Media Articles/Programs Made with Mekong Watch Involvement April 2024 - March 2025

	年月日	掲載紙名	テーマ・表題
_	.,,	1977	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	2024/4/5	東洋経済	単身で軍に抵抗したミャンマー元警察官の願い
	2024/6/3	RIM	NGO がトラフィギュラ向け融資の停止を要請
	2024/7/11	ミャンマージャ	「日本の TASAKI はミャンマー軍政の国際犯罪に加担する恐れ」人権団
		ポン	体ら指摘

2024/7/12	Mizzima	Luxury Japanese jeweler TASAKI funds junta through Myanmar Pearl Enterprise		
2024/7/12	ミャンマーニュ	日本の「TASAKI」に制裁対象のミャンマー国営企業との全取り引き終		
2021/1/12	ース	了を要請: JFM		
2024/7/18	東京新聞	なにが巨額損失を招いたのか…官民ファンド JOIN が赤字 955 億円 ミ		
,,,,,,,	P14424-1211-12	ヤンマーで事業中断、安倍氏案件で大損		
2024/8/22	newsclip.be	800 億円損失の官製ファンド、市民グループが国交省に情報公開と人		
		権配慮要		
2024/9/21	NHK	調査報道 新世紀 File5 ミャンマー軍を支える巨大な闇		
2024/10/31	Sustainable	【日本】環境 NGO、投資家に SOMPO ホールディングスへの気候エンゲ		
	Japan	ージメント要請。5 社が応じる		
2024/11/5	オルタナ	環境 NGO が金融機関 50 社に気候変動や人権尊重を要求へ		
2024/12/8	Thai PBS The	タイの化石ガスプロジェクトへの日本の投資 クリーンエネルギーへの		
	Active	移行を遅らせる懸念(タイ語)		
2024/12/9	Today	世界的な「石油・ガス会社」の資金源は世界をリードするどの銀行		
		か?(タイ語)		
2024/12/12	Spring News	日本産の折りたたみ式ソーラーパネル(タイ語)		
2024/12/16	Today	パタゴニアはなぜ味噌を販売しているか?(タイ語)		
2024/12/17	東京新聞	会倍政権の「レガシー」 は超赤字でも「存続決定」 国が出資する官		
		民ファンド 人権上危うい投資先にもカネ		
2024/12/31	Sustainable	【日本】人権 NGO、婦人服大手ハニーズのミャンマー人権侵害で声		
	Japan	明。是正措置等要求		
2025/1/6	The 101 World	タイの電力システムの競争を高めるためになぜ「市場メカニズム」を		
		活用する必要があるのか? (タイ語)		
2025/1/8	Bangkok Post	Farms and solar energy can co-exist		
2025/1/15	THE STANDARD	世界が再生可能エネルギー時代へ移行する中、日本はなぜ新たな石炭		
		火力発電所を開設しているのか?(タイ語)		
2025/1/16	THE STANDARD	温室効果ガス排出の元凶である化石燃料の段階的廃止に向けた世界的な		
		取り組みの中、日本は2023年に新規石炭火力発電所を開設(タイ語)		
2025/1/26	Spring News	日本が石炭火力発電を再開 世界の流れに逆行(タイ語)		
2025/1/28	Today	「発電所」からの大気汚染で死ぬ人が出るべきではない。日本の地域		
0005 /5 /5=		の喘息はタイの PM2.5 のように人々を死なせている (タイ語)		
2025/2/25	ふぇみん	政府と企業に国連「ビジネスと人権に関する指導原則を」紛争・軍事		
		占領と私たちの暮らし		

Appendix 5

# Meetings with Government Institutions April 2024 - March 2025

年月日	協議の名称など	提起したテーマ・問題
2024/11/7	財務省 NGO 定期協議	OECD アレンジメントの第6条改訂交渉、国際協力銀行によるベトナム・ブロックBオモン事業融資決定、JBIC債保有機関からの気候変動エンゲージメントについて

<sup>\*</sup>その他、ミャンマーに関して非公開の会合を行っています。

### **Board of Directors**

[Directors:] [Aud Fukuda, Kenji Representative Director Iked Higashi, Satomi Deputy Representative Director [Auditor:] İkeda, Miki

Onizuka, Madoka Chase Kiguchi, Yuka Sakamoto, Yuki Shimizu, Noriko Shin'e, Toshihiko Doi, Toshiyuki

[Advisor:] Matsumoto, Satoru

### Staff

Endo, Satoko Policy Coordinator (full-time) Executive Director (full-time) Kiguchi, Yuka Senior Advisor (full-time) Doi, Toshiyuki

Consultant (part-time) Akimoto, Yuki Fujimatsu, Rin Consultant (part-time)

(Board, staff, interns as of March 31, 2025)

### **Donor Institutions**

Foundation to Promote Open Society and others

## 事 業 報 告 用

# 令和6年度 収支計算書(その他事業が<u>ない</u>場合)

Mekong Watch

FY 2024 Financial Statements

特定非営利活動法人 メコン・ウォッチ (Unit:JPY) (単位:円)

		(Unit:JPY)	(単位:円)
	科 目 Items	金 額 Amount	小計・合計 Total
[A]	経 常 収 益 Revenue		
1	受取会費 Membership Fee		280, 947
	正会員受取会費 General Member Membership Fee	224, 947	
	養助会員受取会費 Supporting Member Membership Fee	56, 000	
2	受取寄附金 Donation	,	112, 000
	受取寄附金 Donation	112,000	,
3	受取助成金等 Grant		17, 590, 621
	受取助成金 Grant	17, 590, 621	, 000, 521
4	事業収益 Operating Revenue	11,000,021	431, 176
	調査研究事業収益 Monitoring and Research	0	101, 170
	情報発信事業収益 Outreach	431, 176	
	政策提言事業収益 Advocacy	131, 170	
	委託収入 Contract Income	0	
5	その他の収益 Other Revenue	U	816, 445
3	受取利息 Interest Income	9, 385	010, 443
	雑収入 Miscellaneous Income	807, 060	
47 J	為替差益 Exchange Gain	0	10.001.100
経常			19, 231, 189
[B]	経 常 費 用 Expenditure		
1	事業費 Project Expenses		
	(1)調査研究活動事業 Monitoring and Research		13, 175, 675
	人件費 Staff Salary	8, 240, 128	
	プロジェクトモニタリング Project monitoring	4, 935, 547	
		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
	(2)情報の発信や開発・環境教育活動事業 Outreach		1, 682, 120
	人件費 Staff Salary	1,679,031	1, 002, 120
	ウェブサイト Website	3, 089	
	/ - / / / I. MEDSITE	3,009	
	(2) 政学担言活動主業 ////////////////////////////////////		2, 230, 408
	(3) 政策提言活動事業 Advocacy	0.000.400	۷, ۷۵۵, 408
	人件費 Staff Salary	2, 230, 408	
	######################################		19
	業費計 Project Expenses TOTAL		17, 088, 203
2	管理費 Administration Expenses		=.
	(1) 人件費 Staff Salary		1, 450, 190
	給与福利厚生費 Staff Salary and Welfare	1, 450, 190	,
	(2)その他経費 Other Expenses		1, 689, 980
	東京事務所 Tokyo Office		
	家賃・水道・光熱費 Office Rent and Utility	1, 116, 545	
	消耗品 Supplies	12, 390	
	器具備品費 Equipments	4, 345	
	年次会議費 Annual Meetings	0	
	会議費 Meetings	ام	
	通信費 Telecommunications	124, 627	
	印刷費 Printing	192, 376	
	資料購入費 Reference Materials	12, 286	
	国内旅費 Travel		
		196, 602	
	維費 Miscellaneous	26, 060	
	海外事務所雑費 Overseas Office Expenses	0	
	為替差損 Exchange Loss	4, 749	0 110 1=0
	理費計 Administration Expenses TOTAL		3, 140, 170
経常			20, 228, 373
当期			-997, 184
[C]	経 常 外 収 益 Non-recurring Revenue		
	固定資産売却益 Gain on Sale of Fixed Assets		
	過年度損益修正益 Earnings on Adjustment of Profit/Loss for Previous Fiscal Years		
経常	外 収 益 計 Non-recurring Revenue TOTAL		0
【D】	経常外費用 Non-recurring Expenditure		V
171	固定資産売却損 Loss on Sales of Fixed Assets		
	災害損失 Disaster Loss		
47 311	過年度損益修正損 Loss on Adjustment of Profit/Loss for Previous Fiscal Years		
経常			0
当 期	│ 経 常 外 増 減 額 【C】—【D】 ・・・② Non-recurring Bala	nce	0
税」引		se/Decrease before Ta	-997, 184
	法人税、住民税及び事業税 ・・・④ Corporate tax, resident tax, and business tax		0
	前期繰越正味財産額 ・・・⑤ Net Worth Carried From the Previous Fiscal Year		18, 872, 800
次 期	繰越正味財産額③-④+⑤ Net Worth Carried Forward to	the Next Fiscal Year	17, 875, 616
/\ 79	「A AC エー・スト AN A工 日民 (タ) (マノ ) (ロ) Ling Ling Ling Ling Ling Ling Ling Ling	cho none i robal ibal	17,070,010

## 事業報告用

# 令和6年度 貸借対照表

FY2024 Balance Sheet

Mekong Watch

特定非営利活動法人 メコン・ウォッチ Unit: JPY

		Ŧ.)		<u>,</u> ,		<b>47</b> 4 :		nit:JPY
		<u>科</u>	<u> </u>	Items	金	額 Amount	小計・合計	Total
[ <u>A</u> ]	資							
1	<u>流動</u> 資	資産 Current	Assets					
			and cash equivalents			26, 454, 226		
	未	:収金 Account	s receivable			0		
	立	替金 Advance	es paid			0		
流	動資産合	合計 ・・・①	Current Assets TOTAL				26	, 454, 226
		資産 Fixed As						,
			Tangible Fixed Assets					
	( , ,	111111111111111111111111111111111111111	Tanguare Francisco					
	(2)	無形固定咨離	Intangible Fixed Assets					
	(2)	<b>示</b> // 四// 月// 月// 月// 月// 月// 月// 月// 月// 月	Incangible Lived Assets					
	(0)	11次スの44の	資産 Investments and Other .	A+-				
				ASSETS		F00 000		
	1禾	証金 Guarant	tee deposit			500, 000		
	<b>上</b>	A =1 6	T' I A I TOTAL					F00 000
百	正 負 座 1	台計 ・・・(2	) Fixed Assets TOTAL					500,000
[A]	資 産	合 計 ①-	⊢② TOTAL ASSETS				26	, 954, 226
								, ,
[B-			ß Liabilities					
1	流動負	負債 Current	Liabilities					
		:払金 Account				0		
			e payments received			8, 974, 101		
	預	り金 Deposit	S			104, 509		
			Current Liabilities TOTAL				9	, 078, 610
2	固定負	負債 Fixed Li	iabilities					
固	定負債金	合計 ・・・4	Fixed Liabilities TOTAL					0
			iabilities TOTAL				9	, 078, 610
(B-			産の部 Net Worth					, ,
` <u> </u>			至額 Net Worth Carried From	the Previous Fiscal	Year		18	, 872, 800
			成額 Net Increase/Decrease	III III.IJab IIboai	1001			-997, 184
正味			let Worth TOTAL					875, 616
[B]	負債及	び正味財産合語	+ [B-1] + [B-2] TOTAL	LIABILITIES AND NE	T WORTH		26	, 954, 226
								•

## **Audit Report**

I have audited the FY2024 (April 1, 2024 - March 31, 2025) financial reports of Mekong Watch, an incorporated non-profit organization (NPO) in Japan.

The audit was conducted in accordance with the Accounting Standard of NPOs in Japan. I acknowledge that Mekong Watch's activities were conducted appropriately and that its financial statements and balance sheet were prepared according to legal principles.

Also, I hereby note that upon auditing, an Audit Checklist for NPOs, designed to review internal procedures of the financial management of NPOs in Japan and overseas was also used. These checkpoints include, 1) whether the organization abided by spending procedure rules, 2) whether personnel expenses were paid according to the rules and legally required records were kept, and 3) evidence of expenses were appropriately filed and stored. I performed a review those points including and found no violation of rules or particular instances to report.

Thus, I hereby acknowledge that the organization's internal control this fiscal year was acceptable.

May 13, 2025

Miki Ikeda
Miki Ikeda

Auditor

Mekong Watch 3F Aoki Building, 1-12-11 Taito, Taito-ku, Tokyo 110-0016, JAPAN Tel: 03-3832-5034 Fax: 03-3832-5039 E-mail: info@mekongwatch.org Website: www.mekongwatch.org