Mekong Watch CATFISH TALES
2 October 2002 Issue #6
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CONTENTS
1. Note from the Editor: Apology for delay in releasing Issue #6 of
Catfish Tales.
2. JAPANESE ODA POLICY NEWS: JBIC's DRAFT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE FOR THE
JBIC ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES. 30 August 2002.
JBIC has released its draft for the Complaints Procedure for the new JBIC
Environmental Guidelines. This draft is now under discussion. There are
many problems with JBIC's proposed Procedure, raising questions about
JBIC's commitment to enforce the Environmental Guidelines.
2. PROJECT UPDATE: MOFA FAILS TO EXPLAIN SOCIAL-IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR
BALUCHAUNG HYDROPOWER PLANT No2 REPAIR PROJECT (Burma). 27 August 2002.
A Member of the Japanese Parliament submitted written questions to MOFA
inquiring about the precise methods used in conducting the social impact
assessment for the Baluchaung Hydropower Plant No2 Repair Project. The
written response simply stated that JICA's guidelines were followed,
failing to give any specifics about measures, such as measures needed to
ensure that people they met were free from intimidation.
3. JAPANESE ODA POLICY NEWS: "ACTION PLAN" ANNOUNCED. REFORM OF THE
JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON ITS WAY? 21 August 2002.
MOFA has released its Action Plan for Reform. In regard to ODA, points
for reform include environmental guidelines for JICA and reviews of the 2KR
and debt relief grant programs.
4. PROJECT UPDATE: LAM TAKHONG PUMP STORAGE PROJECT, THAILAND. 11
September 2002.
Many villagers have suffered from respitory and other health problems as a
result of blasting during construction of the Lam Takhong Pump Storage
Project. Villagers have repeatedly requested action from EGAT (the project
implementing agency), as well as the World Bank and JBIC, who financed the
project. Adequate measures have yet to be seen.
5. MEKONG WATCH E-MAIL/WEBSITE
6. TO SUBSCRIBE AND UNSUBSCRIBE
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1. Note from the Editor: Apology for gap since last Catfish Tales.
Hopefully, you have all had holidays at some point during these past 6
weeks, so that you did not notice that Issue #6 is long overdue. But now
that I have brought it to your attention, for those that did notice, I
apologize for the delay. We also had a short holiday in August, followed
by a flurry of trips overseas, so we were unable to get Issue 6 out as
scheduled. But things are now somewhat back to normal, so you can again
expect regular updates on Japanese ODA from us here at Mekong Watch
Japan! Thank you for your support.
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2. JAPANESE ODA POLICY NEWS: JBIC's DRAFT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE FOR THE
JBIC ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES. 30 August 2002.
JBIC's new Environmental Guidelines will go into effect in October 2003,
together with a complaints procedure. People who are negatively affected
by the impacts of projects funded by JBIC will be able to file complaints
with this new procedure.
JBIC released its draft complaints procedure for the new Environmental
Guidelines just prior to a public consultation held on 30 Aug 2002. An
unofficial English translation will be made available soon. The Japanese
original is available on the JBIC website
at:
http://www.jbic.go.jp/autocontents/japanese/news/2002/000067/4handout-1.pdf
The draft makes it clear that there is going to be a struggle ahead to
ensure that the complaints procedure is effective and fair. To sum it up
in one word, the draft procedure is: DEPLORABLE.
Some problems with the draft procedure include:
1. Potential Lack of Independence: An "Environmental Inspector" will be
responsible for investigating complaints, but the criteria for this
position do not ensure the Inspector's independence. In order to ensure
neutrality, it is specified that the Inspector must be independent of
JBIC's investing and lending units and cannot belong to those implementing
the project or the parties filing complaints. Other than this, there are
no criteria to ensure that the Inspector would not face a conflict of
interest due to her/his role in the project under investigation. For
example, with the current draft procedure, the Inspector could come from
JBIC's Environment Analysis Division, which is responsible for reviewing
environmental impact assessments.
2. Intimidation of Those who File Complaints: It is mentioned several
times in the draft procedures that those who file complaints may be held
responsible for covering the cost of preliminary investigations or the
inspection if any false statements are found in their submitted
documentation.
3. Timing of Complaints: Complaints can be filed only after serious
damages due to non-compliance have occurred and after loan agreements have
been signed. This means that complaints cannot be raised regarding
foreseeable negative impacts. It is very difficult for investment and
project plans to be changed after loan agreements are signed. These
requirements show a disturbing lack of political will on the part of JBIC
to address problems early and prevent serious damage.
4. Underlying suspicions: The tone of the procedure shows a strong
underlying suspicion that those who will file complaints are not to be
trusted. Multiple references are made to the need to ensure the procedure
is not abused for ulterior political or economic motives. Transparency is
demanded of those who file complaints, while confidentiality of borrowers
is to be taken into account.
NGOs participating in the public consultations continue to raise their
concerns regarding the complaints procedure. In mid-October, JBIC is
expected to issue its second draft.
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2. PROJECT UPDATE: MOFA FAILS TO EXPLAIN SOCIAL-IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR
BALUCHAUNG HYDROPOWER PLANT REPAIR PROJECT (BURMA). 27 August 2002.
After her release from house arrest, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stated that
humanitarian aid could be accepted on the conditions that there is
transparency, accountability, and that it reaches those who are truly in
need. While the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has used her
statement to justify increasing Japanese aid to Burma, MOFA itself has yet
to meet these conditions in the way it is handling the grant for the repair
of the Baluchaung Hydropower Plant No2 ("Baluchaung Repair Project"
hereafter).
On 27 August 2002, MOFA responded to questions submitted by Member of the
House of Counsellors Mr. Hiroyuki Tani regarding the methodology and
results of the social impact assessment for the Baluchaung Repair Project.
In response to inquiries, the Grant Division of MOFA said that a social
impact assessment had been conducted as part of the Basic Design studies
for the Baluchaung Repair Project. Mr. Tani requested an explanation of
the specific items of inquiry/investigation in the social impact assessment
and the methods used to conduct the assessment. MOFA responded simply to
say that the study was done in accordance with the relevant JICA
guidelines, and having done the study in accordance with those guidelines,
results of the study showed that there were no problems in terms of social
or environmental impacts of the Baluchaung Repair Project.
Mr. Tani made direct reference to the study of the ILO's High Level Team,
for which several conditions were agreed upon between the ILO and the
military regime in Burma before the Team began its study. Points of
agreement included guarantees for the safety of those the Team interviewed,
access by the Team members to go anywhere they wanted and to meet anyone
they wished. It was agreed that they could travel without military escort,
but when going into conflict areas where military escort was absolutely
essential, their escort was required to stay on the outskirts of villages
they visited so that the escort could not see who the Team met or hear the
content of any conversation.
Mr. Tani inquired whether any measures such as the High Level Team's had
been taken by those that conducted the social impact assessment for the
Baluchaung Repair Project, but the response cited only the JICA guidelines
with no information about precisely which guidelines were used, or the
content of those guidelines. No information on specific measures were
explained.
If the way MOFA is handling the Baluchaung Hydropower Plant No2 Repair
project is any indication of how it will handle future ODA/infrastructure
projects in Burma, there is great cause for concern that Japanese ODA will
continue to be inextricably linked to avoidable human rights abuses and
environmental destruction in Burma.
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3. JAPANESE ODA POLICY NEWS: "ACTION PLAN" ANNOUNCED. REFORM OF THE
JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON ITS WAY? 21 August 2002.
On 21 August 2002, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) released
an Action Plan for ministerial reform. In the past 2 years, MOFA has been
hit with a series of scandals, and reform has become a priority. This
Action Plan is based on recommendations from previous reports. These
reports include the final report of the Working Group for MOFA Reform (see
Catfish Tales Issue #5), the Liberal Democratic Party's Subcommittee on
Reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a group of reform-minded
officials who formed a group within the Ministry to propose their own set
of recommendations for change.
In regard to ODA, there are several points of interest in the Action
Plan. Chapter 5 is entitled, "Increasing Efficiency and Transparency of
ODA." This chapter includes a list of measures to be taken to reform ODA.
One such measure is to establish environmental guidelines for the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA--agency responsible for implementing
grant aid under MOFA). This measure was also recommended by the Working
Group for MOFA Reform, and it is good to see that MOFA is taking this
recommendation on board. These guidelines should be finalized by the end
of December this year. It is not yet clear, however, how much public input
there will be in the drafting process.
Another point of interest is that MOFA is going to review its 2KR program
(grant aid for increase of food production) which may lead to the program's
abolishment. 2KR has been the target of much criticism because lack of
monitoring has led to several severe problems. 2KR grants are used for
purchasing agricultural equipment, pesticides, and other agrochemicals. It
has been found the use of some of these grants remains unaccounted for, and
in other places, has lead to stockpiles of expired agrochemicals now turned
to toxic waste. Some of this aid has been given to countries in conflict,
and where it is conceivable that the funds which are unaccounted for could
have been used for military purposes. Criticism of 2KR has highlighted
some of the problems in Japanese grant aid, and MOFA's review of this
program is long overdue. A final decision on 2KR is expected at the end of
this year.
Regarding Debt Relief Grants, this is also going to be reviewed by MOFA
together with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry. Debt Relief Grants have also been criticized for the lack of
transparency and MOFA's failure to monitor them. Significant sums of
grants are now unaccounted for as a result of insufficient monitoring. For
example, for the 4 fiscal years 1995 to 1998, approximately 5 billion yen
worth in debt relief grants to the military regime in Burma is unaccounted
for.
It remains to be seen how effectively this Action Plan will be
implemented. We at Mekong Watch will be paying most attention to progress
in JICA's environmental guidelines and debt relief grants.
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4. PROJECT UPDATE: LAM TAKHONG PUMP STORAGE PROJECT, THAILAND.
The Lam Takhong Pump Storage Project is a 1,000 megawatt pump storage power
plant constructed in Thailand's Nakhon Ratchasima Province. The project was
implemented by Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), and in
1995, the World Bank approved loans for construction (USD 100
million). JBIC provided loans of (18.242 billion yen--approx USD 148.5
million) for procurement of materials and equipment.
The reservoir was constructed in a hilly area, but due to use of explosives
for blasting work during its construction, a considerable amount of dust
was produced. This has brought on various health problems to the
surrounding communities, including asthma, respiratory difficulties, and
rashes. Many children born since the blasting started are suffering from
incomplete development. Farming and livestock-raising have also been
affected and wells have dried up. The EIA approved by the World Bank
included mitigation measures, but most of these measures have either failed
or not been implemented. For example, it was promised that 0.8 hectares of
land would be given to each of the 72 households which lost farmland. This
promise, however, has not been completed.
Due to EGAT's failure to adequately respond to complaints from affected
communities, they joined the Assembly of the Poor and demanded that the
Thai Government establish an investigative committee. Of EGAT, the
affected communities are demanding 1) supply of safe water, 2) compensation
for damaged during construction, 3) establishment of a village fund to
address the health problems brought on by construction, and 4) compensation
for damages to livestock and crops.
In order to prove damages, villagers went to the district hospital to
collect health records. Villagers report, however, that they were only
given records of childbirth and accidents, and were told that records of
people who had health difficulties during construction "did not exist."
In regard to JBIC, the Assembly of the Poor sent a letter in May demanding
that JBIC take responsibility as a project funder. JBIC responded,
however, that it was the World Bank that financed the construction. Then
on September 11th, the people held a meeting with JBIC officials at the
JBIC office in Bangkok. They demanded that JBIC urge EGAT to fund a
neutral working group to investigate the problems. At that time, JBIC
insisted that it was not responsible for problems resulting from
construction, but that it would continue to follow the developments in the
Thai government's handling of this project.
In regard to the World Bank, villagers submitted a complaint on September
11th to the Bangkok office and demanded that the World Bank also take
responsible action. Officials at the World Bank promised (verbally) to
look into the issues.
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5. NEW MEKONG WATCH E-MAIL/WEBSITE
Mekong Watch has acquired its own domain name. Now, staff in Tokyo can be
reached at <info@mekongwatch.org>.
Our new website address is http://www.mekongwatch.org/
The English website is still being developed. While there are a few basic
pages available, the site will be completely renewed in the next few months
in order to provide more detailed information in English. Tentative
start-up will be early November.
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6. To Subscribe and Unsubscribe
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